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Why do they want the UN to decide?  
A two-step model of public support for UN authority 
ABSTRACT 
Why do citizens support or reject the idea of global authority? The paper addresses this ques-
tion by examining individual attitudes about UN authority in a comparative perspective. Ac-
cording to the main argument put forward in this paper, we may think of the formation of citi-
zens’ support for international authority as a two-step process. First, the paper theorizes the 
formation of global attitudes about the UN according to a process of cognitive mobilization. 
Using data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2007), I find strong empiri-
cal support for the role of individual attention to public cues for the relevance of the UN in 
rising global awareness of UN authority. In the second step, the paper examines how cogni-
tively mobilized citizens use available information to make up their minds about UN authori-
ty. The analysis shows that global public support for UN authority largely depends on a cos-
mopolitan understanding of global interdependence and moral universalism. However, the 
analysis of contextual variables also suggests that a "particularist" calculus of national costs 
and benefits explains citizens' support for (and rejection of) UN authority to a remarkable 
extent. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Why do some citizens support the idea of the UN as a global political authority? Why do oth-
ers want political authority to be placed solely at state or regional level? These questions be-
come increasingly pressing as some international institutions begin to acquire political author-
ity, that is, as states and non-state actors more and more recognize these institutions’ capacity 
to significantly shape binding decisions in world politics (Cooper et al., 2008). It is widely 
held, that states have shifted authority to the international level through delegation as in the 
case of international courts or centralized monitoring agencies, and through pooling resulting 
from the introduction of majority voting (Zürn et al., 2012). The United Nations is a promi-
nent case in point: since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has increasingly 
approved Chapter VII measures, including military intervention to resolve conflicts, which 
“now seems well within the Security Council's legitimate authority” (Philpott, 1999: 588). 
The Council has established international criminal courts and transitional administrations that 
are widely held to exercise “a degree of authority over the domestic arrangements in post-
conflict societies that is unprecedented in the history of the United Nations” (Zaum, 2006: 
455). With respect to agenda setting and monitoring, states and publics alike recognize vari-
ous UN agencies and actors like the Secretary General, the High Commissioners for Refugees 
(UNHCR) or Human Rights (UNHCHR) as important authorities and treat them as among the 
most credible sources of information on major international political matters (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 
2010).  
One outcome of these shifts has been that international governance in general and the UN 
in particular are said to be politicized, that is, the subjects of increasing public awareness, 
scrutiny, and contestation (Schmitter, 1969; Zürn et al., 2012). Growing public expectation 
that international institutions will be able to solve pressing political problems as well as the 
increasingly feared costs of abdicating national sovereignty are thought to play a crucial role 
in the formation of public attitudes (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). How-
ever, empirical accounts of what citizens think about international institutions and why they 
do so are rare, at least with respect to global institutions like the UN (but see Millard, 1993; 
Machida, 2009; Gravelle, 2011; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011).  
This paper aims to contribute to this issue by examining, on a comparative basis, the distri-
bution of individual attitudes toward UN authority. It theorizes the formation of public atti-
tudes toward international authority as a two-step process. In the first step, citizens are stimu-
lated to become aware of international institutions like the UN. This occurs as their general 
interest in political matters increases and as they begin to learn more about specific interna-
tional institutions. In this way, public awareness of UN authority is theorized as a product of 
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what has been termed cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970) and the result of a so-called 
global skill revolution (Rosenau, 2003); it is ascribed to increased levels of education, media 
exposure, and associated cues from political elites. 
In the second step, citizens are thought to form specific attitudes towards international in-
stitutions, according to the type of information they receive in the public realm. Here, my dis-
cussion focuses on two competing perspectives on international institutions—political cos-
mopolitanism and what I tentatively call particularism—expecting, that citizens might use 
available information to make up their minds along similar lines of reasoning.  
According to a cosmopolitanism perspective, political problems have become increasingly 
transnational in scope due to functional interdependencies fostered by globalization and nor-
mative duties engendered by a commonly shared universalist morality (e.g. Held, 1995; Ha-
bermas, 1998; Archibugi, 2004). Nation states, this perspective holds, fail to tackle such glob-
al problems adequately, because of structural obstacles to regulating cross-border social trans-
actions. International institutions are presumed to do better at managing global tasks and 
problems, and political cosmopolitanism has suggested ways to build a just and efficient 
global order that distributes political authority at various levels including the global one—
typically by strengthening the UN. Cosmopolitanism may therefore be a promising starting 
point from which to think about why citizens think favorably about UN authority. 
Nevertheless, holding a cosmopolitan worldview to a greater or lesser extent may be nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient as a condition for supporting the idea of global authority. Fol-
lowing a more particularist line of reasoning about international institutions (e.g. Krasner, 
1991; Grieco, 1997), public opinion may be more narrowly focused on national (or even indi-
vidual) costs and benefits of shifting authority to the global level. Policy preferences and per-
ceived power asymmetries in the current make-up of global order may therefore play a deci-
sive role in how citizens position towards global authority.  
These alternative explanations are tested using data from the fifth wave of the World Val-
ues Survey (2005-2007). I find strong empirical evidence for the cognitive mobilization ap-
proach and the role of public cues signaling the political relevance of the UN, thus making 
citizens aware of the issues and stakes, and even supportive of UN authority. Empirical evi-
dence also supports the notion that a favorable public attitude toward UN authority is signifi-
cantly linked to a cosmopolitan worldview. The extent to which citizens believe that nation 
states fail to properly address pressing global political matters is strongly linked to public 
support for UN authority as expected. This is good news for all proponents of political cos-
mopolitanism that seek social legitimacy for its basic constitutional principles, and desire a 
forceful and empowered UN as the core of a future cosmopolitan democracy (e.g. Held, 1995; 
Archibugi, 2004). Nevertheless, there is ample empirical evidence that a particularist logic 
drives citizens’ attitudes toward the idea of UN authority as well. Citizens seem to heavily 
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weigh their own benefits from and costs of past UN action when they make up their mind 
about UN authority at present. Most remarkably, citizens of powerful states much more favor 
UN authority than do those from weaker states—a strong signal that UN authority is expected 
to further privilege the former to the disadvantage of the latter. 
2 THEORY: COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND SOME 
REALIST OBJECTIONS 
2.1 Cognitive mobilization and public cues 
There is widely shared skepticism about the role of citizens in international affairs; public 
opinion is believed to be superfluous and volatile because citizens are thought to be generally 
ignorant about what happens outside their own domestic realms. Following what has been 
termed the “Almond Lippmann consensus” on foreign issues (e.g. Holsti, 1992), international 
institutions can be said to be “waltz[ing] before a blind audience” (cf. Aldrich et al., 1989). 
This refers to the supposition that most citizens seem to lack the information necessary to 
form factually based opinions about processes that are typically criticized for their lack of 
transparency (Florini, 2005; Lloyd et al., 2008). But, contrary to this supposition, a raft of 
studies has shown that European institutions have already become widely accessible objects 
of public attention (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995; Weßels, 
2007). A similar conclusion can be drawn from studies that use survey evidence to prove that 
public attitudes on global institutions like the UN are consistently structured according to the-
oretical expectations (Furia, 2005; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011; Gravelle, 2011). 
Even when existing survey research convincingly demonstrates that many citizens seem to 
hold consistent sets of attitudes toward international institutions, there remains nevertheless a 
remarkable portion of them who signal a low level of awareness in the subject matter, for 
example, by not responding to related survey questions at all (Millard, 1993; Gravelle, 2011). 
To ignore this lack of awareness is unfortunate, because we lose sight of how international 
institutions become part of the political game in virtue of heightened public attention (Schmit-
ter, 1969; Ruggie, 2004; Zürn et al., 2012). What is more, the process of raising citizens’ awa-
reness might also determine to a significant degree the substance of public opinion. “Waking 
the sleeping giant” (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004) could ultimately lead to a different dis-
tribution of problem perceptions as well as public preferences for or against addressing politi-
cal problems at a global level. For both reasons, a theory of public opinion formation on glo-
bal authority should first address the more basic question of what drives public awareness of 
international institutions.  
To start with, we may assume that a more general attentiveness to politics may increase the 
likelihood that people learn something about the existence and political relevance of internati-
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onal institutions. Education is said to play a key role in this regard by increasing citizens’ 
“capacity to receive and interpret messages” about international affairs in general and interna-
tional institutions in particular (Inglehart, 1970: 47). Moreover, as a potentially important 
channel for information (e.g. Hainmüller and Hiscox, 2006) education can conceivably lead to 
new generations being more knowledgeable about world affairs then preceding ones (Norris 
and Inglehart, 2009). Similarly, James Rosenau (2003) emphasized the role of education for 
an ongoing “skill revolution” which he plausibly expected to expand “people’s horizons on a 
global scale” (pp. 52, 232 ff; Inglehart, 1997).  
Beyond education, mass media communication has a prominent place in the cognitive mo-
bilization literature (Rosenau, 2003). Even if world politics is not in the focus of the “media-
ted message” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991) most of the time, empirical research has shown 
convincingly that relevant information is often communicated alongside domestic news and 
so-called infotainment (Baum, 2004). Therefore, mass media exposure is a second prime 
candidate for directing citizens’ attention to international institutions.  
Nevertheless, the impact of mere exposure to the political discourse can be expected to va-
ry depending on differences in content, for instance, alternative school or university curricula 
as well as differing journalistic frames and media selection-process standards (see Bennett et 
al., 2004). First, content should increase overall public awareness as citizens receive more 
cues about the political relevance of international institutions. Not too surprisingly, an early 
study conducted by Millard (1993: 93) found that those countries directly affected by UN 
missions are also those with a comparably high level of observed awareness of the UN. Other 
research suggests that journalists send strong signals to their audiences that the UN is an im-
portant authority on complex global issues like humanitarian crisis (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2010). 
Accordingly, we may expect such cues to significantly focus public attention on the UN and 
to facilitate the formation of attitudes with regard to what role the UN should play in world 
politics accordingly. 
Second, the primary mechanisms of cognitive mobilization—education and mass media 
exposure—may also foster public preference for or against shifting political authority to the 
global level, depending on what kind of information is provided (see Zaller, 1992; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998; Díez Medrano and Braun, 2011). Assuming that the citizenry received 
predominantly positive cues from textbooks, the media, and political elites, Inglehart (1970) 
expected mobilization to increase the likelihood that individuals would hold positive attitudes 
towards international institutions (in this case, the European communities). Similar arguments 
have been made for related issues such as free trade (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006) and re-
gional integration beyond the European context (e.g. Kwon, 2010). But such expectations are 
probably less intuitive today than they were in the past, given that numerous groups in the 
public realm have started to regularly contest regional and global international institutions 
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(Zürn et al., 2012). While a variety of studies has indeed suggested that more educated indivi-
duals tend to lend greater support to international institutions (Inglehart, 1970, Furia, 2005; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006), others have disputed these results on empirical grounds (e.g. 
Janssen, 1991; Gabel, 1998; Tallberg and Dellmuth, 2011). 
To sum up, a focus on cognitive mobilization can be expected to capture a great deal of 
how citizens form attitudes toward global governance. Mobilization mechanisms like educati-
on and mass media exposure should direct citizens’ attention to the available information on 
UN policies and procedures in the public realm. Individual attentiveness to and comprehensi-
on of political discourse should have substantial explanatory power; so, too, should the degree 
to which public discourse contains strong cues that lead citizens to assume the UN is political-
ly relevant. The impact of cognitive mobilization on specific preferences can be expected to 
be more complex, because different types of available information are likely to lead to con-
flicting attitudes toward UN authority. Assuming that the public discourse about UN action 
and procedures is still more often positive than not, I expect cognitive mobilization and public 
discourse to foster substantial public support of UN authority. The following hypothesis at-
tempts to capture this line of thought about the important but largely contingent role of the 
cognitive mobilization mechanism for the formation of public attitudes toward UN authority. 
H1.1: Citizens are aware of UN authority the more they are (a) cognitively mobilized and (b) 
publicly exposed to information that suggests the political relevance of the UN.  
H1.2: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they are (a) cognitively mobilized 
in general and (b) publicly exposed to public discourse.  
2.2 Cosmopolitan reasons for supporting global authority 
If citizens become aware of UN authority and start to use available information to form and 
revise their attitudes toward it, then how could information lead them to support it? A good 
starting point here would be to consider the school of thought that presumably favors global 
authority the most, namely, political cosmopolitanism (e.g. Held, 1995; Habermas, 1998; 
Beck, 2004; Archibugi, 2004, Cabrera, 2004). Echoing almost century-old ideas from earlier 
writings in international relations (IR) theory and economics (see Keohane and Nye, Jr., 1977; 
Baldwin, 1980), cosmopolitan writers claim that the need for international institutions derives 
primarily from functional interdependence caused by globalization, that is, “the intensificati-
on of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happe-
nings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990: 64). 
The plethora of risks and opportunities brought on by globalization gradually transforms nati-
onal communities into a plurality of transnational “communities of fate” (Held, 2003). Citi-
zens have become vulnerable to the costs imposed by globalization, because national 
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governments are incapable of regulating it unilaterally. Political cosmopolitans therefore typi-
cally assume that globalization not only defines the agenda of public issues, but also compels 
and propels the “creation of political organizations and mechanisms that would provide a 
framework of regulation and law enforcement across the globe” (Held, 2003: 523). 
The inability of individual nation states to regulate global problems efficiently is just one 
reason for political cosmopolitans to argue for the redistribution of regulative power from the 
national to the international level; a second is moral interdependence. Drawing upon a 
broader tradition of cosmopolitan thinking, they acknowledge “some notion of common hu-
manity that translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others 
by virtue of this humanity” (Lu, 2000: 245). It is for this shared sense of humanity that all 
sorts of human suffering should be of concern to everyone who is aware of them, irrespective 
of whether or not one has any particular ties to those suffering (Nussbaum, 1994; O'Neill, 
2000; Singer, 1972).  
Regarding transnational politics, the moral significance of similar or related obligations has 
been the starting point for a variety of humanitarian as well as development agencies and lar-
ge-scale private donorship (Linklater, 2007). Therefore, we can expect the cosmopolitan noti-
on of an “obligation to assist” to be of some public significance; but, by itself, this obligation 
fails to address the broader issue of an unfair or unjust international order. This is a major 
concern, for instance, of those who identify strongly with the global justice movement (della 
Porta, 2007) and others who consider themselves to be cosmopolitan proponents of global 
institutions (e.g Pogge, 2002). Because state dominated international politics has led to a 
plethora of injustices worldwide, it is argued that a global authority is highly desirable becau-
se it would be in a better position to promote and implement human rights, to fulfill our obli-
gation to assist those in need, and to establish fairness in international trade (e.g. Beitz, 1979; 
Cabrera, 2004).  
In accordance with this line of thinking, we may expect cosmopolitan derived support for 
global authority to be linked to two types of beliefs. The first type leads citizens to define sa-
lient political problems as inherently global and may rest on functional interdependence, but 
also on a strong normative appeal to universalism in terms of global solidarity and justice. 
The second type of beliefs is about the inefficacy of nation states in tackling global problems; 
that is, that there is a political authority vacuum at the global level, which only global institu-
tions would be able to fill. The cosmopolitan model of public support for global authority has 
observable implications that can be tested. The following three hypotheses are assumed to 
capture the most important ones in order to determine whether public opinion follows the 
cosmopolitan line of reasoning about global authority in any significant way. 
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H2.1: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more global (i.e. driven by global func-
tional interdependence) they perceive the salient political problems to be. 
H2.2: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they commit themselves to norms 
of global solidarity and justice. 
H2.3: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the less capable they perceive their own 
nation state to be in solving salient political problems. 
2.3 Particularist reasons for (and against) supporting global authority 
Public opinion might not “tick” cosmopolitan at all. First, citizens may not as strongly be in 
favor of global authority as most proponents of political cosmopolitanism might wish. Se-
cond, citizens might come to favor or reject global authority for “non-cosmopolitan” reasons, 
which can be subsumed tentatively under the label of “political particularism.” For example, 
as realists have claimed for decades (Krasner, 1991), advocates of international institutions 
tend to obscure their distributional consequences in terms of power as well as policy outco-
mes. Political cosmopolitans have rejected the criticism on normative as well as empirical 
grounds (Archibugi, 2004). However, any attempt to theorize public support for global autho-
rity has to account for citizens’ “particularism” in reasoning about international politics. In 
any case, we would need to know how much of current support for global authority (or lack 
thereof) is due to particularistic reasoning if we are to believe that empirical evidence for 
cosmopolitan support of global authority is not simply an artifact produced by omitting parti-
cularist variables from the analysis.  
First, on a particularist account, citizens might expect direct material benefits from empo-
wered institutions. In the case of the UN, observers have argued that the least developed 
countries of the so-called global (political) South have benefited much more directly from 
what is for global (political) North only an abstract idea of global authority (Duffield, 2005; 
Jäger, 2007). Aid agencies, for example, in parts of the global South have benefitted directly 
from regular funding of UN programs. Similarly, citizens of countries that host large UN 
peacekeeping missions are probably more likely to view UN authority as beneficial in terms 
of security, rather than detrimental in terms of sovereignty costs. We may therefore expect 
those societies for which the UN is an important source of badly needed aid or security to 
favor UN authority.  
Second, citizens’ support may derive from their country’s success in pushing for its agenda 
and policy preferences in the UN system that fosters a public perception of the UN as being a 
like-minded (and therefore fertile) environment for global cooperation (Koenig-Archibugi, 
2004: 143). Conversely, citizens might receive information about political initiatives that have 
been blocked or resolutions that run counter to citizens’ own preferences; this should lead 
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them to perceive the UN as a potentially “dangerous place” (Moynihan, 1976) of political 
marginalization. Consequently, perceptions of the UN as a like-minded environment can be 
expected to foster public support for a shift of authority to the global level, while perceptions 
of the UN as politically hostile can be expected to lead to strong public opposition to such an 
authority shift.  
A third proposition is based on the notion of power asymmetries. Citizens can be assumed 
to have some intuitive understanding of the “sovereignty costs” for national political systems 
implied by shifting political authority to global institutions. At the same time, they might fa-
vor such shift the more they can expect to control such new centers of global authority. For 
example, some realists have argued that less powerful countries are tempted to support inter-
national institutions to exploit voice opportunities (Grieco, 1997). Citizens of these weaker 
countries, on this view, should prefer the imposed sovereignty costs implied by shifting au-
thority to global institutions to allowing their countries to be dominated by major powers un-
der conditions of pure anarchy. But global governance is widely held to suffer from a low 
degree of legitimacy because it is perceived by its critics to be dominated by the highly deve-
loped global North with its institutional privileges, and its economic and military advantages 
(Strange, 1989; Jäger, 2007; Zürn et al., 2012). Institutionalized privileges like a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council may be a strong case in point (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011). 
Beyond tangible institutionalized privilege, however, we can assume a diffuse understanding 
of power asymmetries in global politics that may shape citizens’ attitudes toward UN authori-
ty to a significant extent. For example, such understanding could be based on more or less 
“educated” guesses about how economic power and military strength translates into an advan-
tageous position in controlling global authority’s agenda and decisions. Observable implica-
tions of such non-cosmopolitan shaping of public opinion on UN authority should be revealed 
in at least three broad empirically verifiable relationships. 
H3.1: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the higher the benefits of UN membership in 
terms of financial or military aid for their country through UN programs and mis-
sions. 
H3.2: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive other states to be-
have like-mindedly in UN bodies. 
H3.3: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive power asymmetries 
in global politics to be in their country’s favor. 
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3 DATA AND VARIABLES 
To examine the impact of various factors influencing attitude formation on UN authority, I 
use data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2007)1. I test hypotheses, u-
sing various sets of explanatory variables and controls, by regressing information on awaren-
ess of and preferences for UN authority. Each of the measures used are discussed in turn 
(descriptive statistics are reported in table 1).  
Attitudes regarding UN authority are measured by responses to the following question:  
Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Na-
tions or regional organizations rather than by each national government separately. Others 
think that these problems should be left entirely to the national governments. I’m going to 
mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in 
this area should be decided by the national governments, by regional organizations, or by the 
United Nations? 
Responses used refer to international peacekeeping (V179), protection of the environment 
(V180), aid to developing countries (V181), refugees (V183), and human rights (V184). The 
aggregate measure AWARENESS OF UN AUTHORITY is 0 if a respondent refused to answer all 
of the five questions and otherwise 1. To measure the strength of an overall preference for UN 
authority PREFERENCE FOR UN AUTHORITY is calculated that counts the number of issue areas 
for which the respondent chose the UN as preferred locus of decision-making.  
Concerning the explanatory variables, a first set of indicators is used to test for cognitive 
mobilization. To measure the individual attentiveness of respondents to available public in-
formation, I use three sets of variables. The first of these, POLITICAL INTEREST, is based on 
responses to the question “How interested would you say you are in politics?” (V95). 
POLITICAL INTEREST ranges from 0 (“not at all interested”) to 3 (“very interested”). 
Second, the inclination among citizens to learn about the UN and form attitudes on UN au-
thority is expected to increase in direct proportion to the time respondents have spent in the 
public educational system. This expectation is tested using the variable EDUCATION, a 9-point 
scale in the WVS data set, ranging from “no formal education” (1) to “university level with 
degree” (9).  
Third, I use items on respondents’ intensity of political communication activities. They we-
re asked to indicate whether they used a specific source last week “to learn what is going on 
in their country and the world.” Information on respondents’ use of daily newspapers (V223), 
news broadcasts on radio or TV (V224), printed magazines (V225), in depth reports on radio 
                                                 
1 Technical information on the Fifth Wave of the World Values Survey can be found on <http://www.worldvalues sur-
vey.org/>.  
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or TV (V226), internet/email (V228) and discussions with friends or colleagues about politi-
cal issues (V229) all refer to possible channels through which respondents may acquire in-
formation on the UN. Answers are aggregated in the index POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, 
which ranges from 0 (none used last week) to 6 (respondents claimed to have used all six 
sources). 
A second set of indicators is used to measure the public availability of information that 
signals political relevance of the UN to citizens. Information availability in mass media com-
munication is measured by the variable UN HEADLINES. The variable equals the percentage of 
newspaper articles that mention the UN in the headlines, published over the five years prece-
ding the survey. Estimates are based on key word searches in the World News Connection 
(WCN) archives (cf. Leetaru, 2010). Only those countries are included in the analysis for 
which at least 1000 articles were translated and provided by the WNC. Because the focused 
coverage of UN action by an article already signals its political relevance (“the UN makes 
headlines”), I assume UN HEADLINES measures the degree to which media content contains 
cues—signals to the public—that the UN is politically relevant. 
The measure PARTY INTERNATIONALISM derives from data on party manifesto content pro-
vided by the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (Klingemann et al., 2006). The project 
coded party manifesto content according to a system that uses two codes for “international-
ism” (per107, per109). These codes capture all favorable and unfavorable mentions of inter-
national cooperation and institutions: 
international cooperation; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of 
resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; 
support for the UN (per107, per109). 
The variable PARTY INTERNATIONALISM equals the percentage of manifesto content for parties 
that took part in one or more elections for the respective countries during the 5 years prece-
ding the survey. Again, I assume that PARTY INTERNATIONALISM measures the degree to 
which the political discourse contains cues by party elites signaling the UN political relevan-
ce. 
Lastly, benefits from UN activities “on the ground” ought to increase public awareness and 
support for UN authority. To test this expectation, the variable UN FLOWS measures per capi-
ta aid provided by the World Bank over last five years preceding the survey. The additional 
variable UN MISSION measures the maximal number of UN personnel per thousand inhabi-
tants in a specific country over last five years preceding the survey, as provided by the UN 
Department of Peace Keeping Operations. 
Regarding cosmopolitan variables, I measure the scope of major political problems using a 
set of related variables on environmental problems. The question reads as follows: 
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Now let’s consider environmental problems in the world as a whole. Please, tell me how seri-
ous you consider each of the following to be for the world as a whole. Is it very serious, 
somewhat serious, not very serious, or not serious at all?  
Answers were solicited on global warming (V111), loss of plant and animal species (V112), 
and pollution of rivers, lakes, and oceans (V113). These variables were used to construct the 
index GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, which is assumed to measure issue salience 
through the cumulative responses in z-standardized form (Cronbach’s α 0.81). 
Two sets of items from the WVS questionnaire seem to plausibly tap on cosmopolitan de-
finitions of universal obligations, including the more demanding variants of justice that reach 
beyond a mere obligation to assist. The first indicator for cosmopolitan morality, 
MILLENNIUM GOALS, is based on a set of items related to the priority respondents believe that 
their own country’s leaders should give to global poverty (V170), education (V171), child 
mortality (V172), HIV (V173), and housing (V174)—the core list of the UN Millennium De-
velopment Goals. 
I’m going to read out a list of global problems, and goals that world leaders have set to re-
duce them. Indicate for each of these goals how high a priority your own country’s leaders 
should give to it. 
The index MILLENNIUM GOALS is an aggregate variable constructed from the cumulative 
responses to all five items in z-standardized form (Cronbach’s α 0.80).  
Respondents were asked in addition about their support for official development aid. This 
is measured two-fold, beginning with the following question. 
In 2003, this country’s government allocated x% of the national income to foreign aid—that 
is, $y per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right? (V175) 
In the event that respondents chose “too low,” a second question was posed wherein they we-
re asked to indicate how much more foreign aid the country should contribute (V176). The 
constructed variable MORE AID translates both answers into a scale of factors by which cur-
rent aid should be multiplied to meet future need and satisfy the respondents’ desire for a mo-
re appropriate sum. The range is from 0.5 to 5, where “too high” is coded as 0.5, “about right” 
as 1, “one-and-a-half as much” as 1.5, “twice as much” as 2, etc., up to “more than four times 
as much” which is coded as 5. 
To test for varying degrees to which citizens are confident in the nation state’s capacity to 
solve important political problems, I use answers about how confident the respondent is in the 
armed forces, the police, the justice system, parliament, government and civil services.. Items 
have been z-standardized and aggregated into an index on STATE CONFIDENCE (Cronbach’s α 
0.86). 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 171) 
- 12 - 
Concerning particular interests, the explanatory power of realist intuitions about what 
might drive respondents to support UN authority or hold them back from doing so is tested 
using four type of information. As already mentioned, one possible source for particular inte-
rests would be direct benefits from UN action as measured by the variables UN FLOWS and 
UN MISSION. 
Table 1: Descriptives 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
AWARENESS OF UN AUTHORITY 68188 .94 .24 0 1 
PREFERENCES FOR UN AUTHORITY 63561 2.07 1.55 0 5 
POLITICAL INTEREST 66719 1.38 .97 0 3 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 65897 -.01 .60 -2.68 1.60 
EDUCATION 67680 5.20 2.53 1 9 
UN HEADLINES 36746 4.64 2.41 .42 9.16 
PARTY INTERNATIONALISM 26709 2.86 1.79 .83 7.45 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROBLEMS 
63754 -.02 .87 -3.78 .76 
STATE CONFIDENCE 67229 .05 .79 -1.95 1.90 
MORE AID 14464 1.56 1.09 .50 5.00 
MILLENNIUM GOALS 22027 -.01 .75 -3.30 .87 
UN FLOWS ($ per 100 inhab.) 64957 .07 .15 .00 .65 
UN MISSION (N staff per 1000 inh’t) 68188 .06 .23 .00 1.59 
UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS 64897 77.97 10.58 34.17 89.94 
UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER 68188 .05 .21 0 1 
UNSC MEMBER 68188 .45 .50 0 1 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES  
($, logged) 
67185 14.73 2.06 9.21 20.02 
GDP (per capita, logged) 67937 41.79 16.57 15.00 98.00 
MALE 68092 .48 .50 0 1 
POSTMATERIALISM 64699 1.78 .63 1 3 
UN CONFIDENCE 59421 1.47 .91 0 3 
INCOME 61438 4.65 2.28 1 10 
POPULATION (logged) 64957 17.30 1.59 13.61 20.98 
A second test of particularism focuses on fears of being outvoted and politically marginalized 
in an empowered UN system. Similar to Koenig-Archibugi’s measure of “policy conformity” 
(2004: 143), UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS is generated from roll-call data for the UN General 
Assembly provided by Voeten and Merdzanovic2. The measure is constructed by gathering 
                                                 
2 Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data," http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379 
UNF:3:Hpf6qOkDdzzvXF9m66yLTg== V1. 
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information for every vote that took place over the last ten years before the WVS was con-
ducted. The variable UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS equals the mean percentage of states that vot-
ed in accordance with the respondent’s country in this 10-year span.  
Third, to account for interests that derive from institutionalized power asymmetries in the 
UN decision-making system, I use the variable UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER that indicates a 
permanent seat and veto power on the UN Security Council (0/1). Similarly, UNSC MEMBER 
refers to countries that served as elected Council members in the 10-year period leading up to 
the survey. Fourth, to account for more diffuse beliefs on the distribution of power at global 
level, I use data on the absolute amounts of national MILITARY EXPENDITURES as provided by 
the Correlates of War (COW) and countries’ GDP PER CAPITA as provided by the World 
Bank. 
To control for variances in overall confidence in the UN, I introduce the variable UN 
CONFIDENCE, which is based on respondents’ answers about the extent to which they feel con-
fident in the UN. Additional controls include survey information provided by the original 
WVS data set on income (INCOME, 9-point scale), postmaterialism (POSTMATERIALISM, 4-item 
version), gender (MALE), age (AGE) and the absolute size of the population (POPULATION) as 
provided by the World Bank. 
4 ANALYSIS 
The hierarchical structure of the data suggests that the analysis would best be served by 
applying multilevel statistics. Individual respondents are embedded in different sociopolitical 
contexts. The theories outlined above suggest that factors at both levels—individual and 
country-level—may be important for the formation of citizens’ attitudes towards UN authori-
ty. I therefore start with a set of two-level logistic regression models that allow us to test the 
explanatory power of individual and country-level variables for respondents’ AWARENESS OF 
UN AUTHORITY (table 2). A country-specific random intercept is included, to account for the 
unobserved heterogeneity among respondents of the same country. This random intercept can 
be thought of as the combined effect of context-specific covariates omitted from the analysis, 
which can cause some respondents to show more awareness of UN authority than others (Ra-
be-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2004: 247).3 Note that some of the context variables are missing or 
constant for many countries, with insufficient overlap to allow for joint testing of hypotheses 
accordingly (see table A.1 in the appendix for details on countries included in the various mo-
dels).  
                                                 
3 For all models presented in table 2 the likelihood-ratio test for testing the assumption that the intraclass correlation (ρ) is 
zero suggests that the inclusion of a random intercept is appropriate. 
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Table 2: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents’ Awareness of UN authority 
Dependent Variable: Awareness of UN authority (0/1) 
Model: 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
Cognitive Mobilization     
POLITICAL INTEREST 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
COMMUNICATION 0.74*** 0.71*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) 
EDUCATION 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
     
Public Cues     
UN FLOWS ($ per 100 inhab.)  3.35*   
  (1.67)   
UN MISSION (N staff per 1000 inh’t)  15.9*   
  (0.77)   
UN HEADLINES   0.34*  
    (0.15)  
PARTY INTERNATIONALISM    0.36*** 
    (0.11) 
     
Controls     
AGE -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MALE 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.65*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
INCOME 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
GDP (per capita, logged)  0.28* -0.02 -0.22 
  (0.14) (0.25) (0.14) 
POPULATION (logged)  -0.12 -0.57* -0.06 
  (0.13) (0.29) (0.14) 
     
CONSTANT 2.18*** 0.80 10.40* 3.30 
 (0.21) (2.95) (4.92) (2.30) 
     
S.D. OF RANDOM INTERCEPT () 1.18 1.01 1.25 0.61 
INTRACLASS CORRELATION () 0.30 0.24 0.32 0.10 
     
LOG LIKELIHOOD -8558.69 -8143.89 -5084.64 -2849.19 
WALD 2 1742.48*** 
1626.48**
* 
1144.25**
* 
636.34*** 
BIC 17206.35 16430.86 10294.10 5818.48 
AIC 17134.63 16315.02 10194.53 5722.37 
N RESPONDENTS 57822 54761 29673 22231 
N COUNTRIES 44 41 20 19 
Note: Multilevel logistic regression with random intercept. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. See appendix for coun-
tries included in the respective models. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Turning to specific estimates, the results are largely consistent with expectations and suggest 
the cognitive mobilization approach has significant explanatory power (H1.1). Estimated coef-
ficients for the variables POLITICAL INTEREST, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION and EDUCATION 
are all positive and highly significant. To expand on the interpretation I turn directly to pre-
dicted probabilities in table 3. Using estimates of models 2.2 to 2.4, the predicted probabilities 
are simulated for minimum and maximum values of key variables, assuming the random in-
tercept to be zero and holding all other variables at their mean values. Predictions indicate that 
the probability of finding respondents aware of the UN authority issue (as measured by a will-
ingness to answer the respective survey questions) is about .03 higher for the most politically 
interested respondents compared to those least interested. A similarly moderate increase of 
about .04 is estimated if one compares those with no formal education to respondents with a 
university degree. In line with theories that stress the role of political communication in cog-
nitive mobilization, the respective difference between respondents is about .14 if one com-
pares those who frequently use a wider range of communication channels—personal discus-
sion, newspapers, books, internet etc.—with those who do not. Taken together, these individ-
ual-level variables can account for a more substantial change in probability of about .33 ac-
cording to these estimates. The results for individual attentiveness to political discourse there-
fore strongly suggest that cognitive mobilization is an important source of citizens’ awareness 
of UN authority (H1.1a).  
As argued above, AWARENESS OF UN AUTHORITY is also expected to vary with the degree 
to which citizens are publicly exposed to information signaling the political relevance of the 
UN. Regarding such contextual factors, results again strongly support expectations (H1.1b). 
Estimated coefficients in table 2 suggest a significant and positive effect for UN FLOWS, UN 
MISSION, PARTY INTERNATIONALISM, UN HEADLINES—all variables used to measure the 
public density of such cues available to citizens in their respective political environments. 
Predicted probabilities for respondents from countries that had not recently hosted a UN mis-
sion is about .04 lower compared to respondents from Cyprus, for example, with about 1300 
peacekeepers in that country (equal to .16 peacekeeper per capita, the sample maximum for 
the variable UN MISSION). Similarly, probabilities differ by almost .04 between respondents 
of a country receiving no UN aid compared to those from Rwanda (with a value of .65 US 
dollars per capita, the sample maximum for UN FLOWS).  
Both media and manifesto salience are also significantly related to AWARENESS OF UN 
AUTHORITY, although substantive impact varies. Regarding PARTY MANIFESTO 
INTERNATIONALISM, that is, the degree to which political parties refer to international issues in 
their party programs, the estimated differences in predicted probabilities between minimum 
and maximum values of “internationalism” is again moderate (.05); but the estimated increase 
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in probability over different degrees of media salience (UN HEADLINES) is about .11, that is, 
more than twice as large.  
Table 3: Impact of change in independent variables on the predicted probability of awareness 
 Predicted Probability of Awareness (0-100) 
 
... at minimum ... at maximum 
Difference  
(min to max) 
... POLITICAL INTEREST .94 .98 +.03 
... POLITICAL COMMUNICATION .85 .99 +.14 
... EDUCATION .94 .98 +.04 
    
... UN FLOWS .95 .99 +.04 
... UN MISSION .96 .98 +.04 
... PARTY INTERNATIONALISM .95 .99 +.05 
... UN HEADLINES .88 .99 +.11 
 
Joint impact of changes in...  
   
... INTEREST & COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION .67 1.00 +.33 
... INTEREST & COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION
& UN FLOWS & UN MISSIONS* 
.61 1.00 +.40 
... INTEREST & COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION
& PARTY INTERNATIONALISM 
.63 1.00 +.37 
... INTEREST & COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION
& UN HEADLINES 
.38 1.00 +.62 
Note: Estimated initial differences in predicted probability, assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other 
variables at their mean. Estimates are based on models presented in table 2.  
* Estimated for Rwandan respondents, with UN MISSIONS=.068 and UN FLOWS= .652 the most extreme combination of 
values of these variables in the sample.  
Taken together, contextual variables add substantially to the explanatory power of the various 
models (table 3). When conditions are most conducive to finding unawareness—if we take 
citizens who are politically disinterested, have little or no formal education, do not regularly 
communicate about politics, and also live in a society where the UN makes almost no head-
lines like the Ukraine (with UN headlines in less than .50 percent of all coded headlines)—
then the predicted probability of finding aware citizens drops from 1.00 to .38 percent. In 
sum, these findings yield substantive support for H1.1, according to which citizens are most 
likely to be aware of UN authority the more politically attentive and publicly exposed they are 
to discourse suggesting that the UN is a politically relevant institution.  
Turning to the question of why citizens support the idea of UN authority, I use multilevel 
ordered logistic regression with a random intercept to test competing explanations. I ran a 
series of (single-level) Heckman selection models before for testing whether results are biased 
by a non-random selection of observations. However, the estimated rho coefficients of these 
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Table 4:  Multilevel Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Preferences for UN authority (1) 
Dependent Variable: N of issue areas for which respondents prefer UN authority (0-5) 
Model: 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6
Cognitive Mobilization   
POLITICAL INTEREST -0.01 -0.02 0.04# -0.00 0.00 -0.01
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 0.10** 0.09* 0.01 0.08* 0.02 0.07
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
EDUCATION 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06** 0.05***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Public Cues   
UN HEADLINES  0.08#  
  (0.05)  
PARTY INTERNATIONALISM  0.15***  
  (0.03)  
Cosmopolitanism   
GLOBAL PROBLEMS  0.12*** 0.14*** 0.15***
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
MORE AID  0.10* 
  (0.04) 
MILLENNIUM GOALS   0.11**
   (0.03)
STATE-CONFIDENCE  -0.18*** -0.14* -0.21**
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Controls   
MALE 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12** 0.12***
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
AGE 0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
POSTMATERIALISM 0.02 0.03 0.11*** 0.00 0.06# 0.01
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
UN CONFIDENCE 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.33*** 0.18***
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04)
   
Constants   
CUT1 -0.95*** -0.39# -0.23 -0.91*** -0.30# -1.12***
 (0.12) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17)
CUT2 -0.01 0.56* 0.79*** 0.03 0.62*** -0.16
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.19) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16)
CUT3 1.03*** 1.58*** 1.78*** 1.08*** 1.64*** 0.92***
 (0.14) (0.25) (0.22) (0.14) (0.23) (0.16)
CUT4 2.08*** 2.58*** 2.81*** 2.15*** 2.68*** 2.03***
 (0.16) (0.28) (0.25) (0.16) (0.26) (0.17)
CUT5 3.03*** 3.49*** 3.74*** 3.10*** 3.65*** 2.93***
 (0.19) (0.34) (0.31) (0.19) (0.33) (0.22)
   
S.D. OF RANDOM INTERCEPT  0.61 0.66 0.54 0.60 0.72 0.62
INTRACLASS CORRELATION () 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.09
BIC 179536.91 96133.02 74094.47 176843.52 44249.71 59578.45
AIC 179421.47 96017.34 73982.59 176710.51 44159.76 59453.72
LOG LIKELIHOOD -89697.73 -47994.67 -36977.30 -88340.25 -22067.88 -29710.86
N Respondents 53116 28644 21678 52439 13301 17956
N Countries 46 24 20 46 12 19
Note: Multilevel Ordered Logit (Random intercept proportional odds model). Robust standard errors clustered over countries 
are given in parenthesis. See appendix for countries included in the respective models. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
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models are all insignificant.4 While I argue for theorizing a two-step process of public opinion 
formation vis-à-vis UN authority, results suggest that these steps can be empirically modeled 
as two independent stages of such a process. 
Table 5:  The Impact of change in independent variables on the predicted probability of pre-
ferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas 
 Predicted probabilities 
 
... at minimum ... at maximum 
Difference  
(min to max) 
Cognitive mobilization and public discourse    
... POLITICAL COMMUNICATION .36 .43 +.08 
... EDUCATION .36 .45 +.09 
... UN HEADLINES .33 .46 +.13 
... PARTY INTERNATIONALISM .32 .54 +.22 
 
Joint impact of changes in...     
... COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION .31 .48 +.17 
... COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION & HEADLINES .24 .54 +.31 
... COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION & PARTY 
INTERNATALISM .28 .59 +.31 
    
Cosmopolitanism     
… GLOBAL PROBLEMS .31 .42 +.12 
… MILLENNIUM GOALS .36 .46 +.10 
… MORE AID .41 .52 +.10 
… STATE CONFIDENCE  .49 .33 -.16 
 
Joint impact of changes in...     
… PROBLEMS & STATE NONCONFIDENCE* .24 .51 +.26 
… PROBLEMS & STATE NONCONFIDENCE* & MORE AID .26 .60 +.35 
… PROBLEMS & STATE NONCONFIDENCE* & 
MILLENNIUM GOALS .19 .59 +.40 
Note: Estimated first differences in predicted probabilities assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other 
variables at their mean. Estimates are based on models presented in table 4.  
* In line with H2.3 probabilities in the “at minimum” (“at maximum”) cell are estimated combining the maximum (mini-
mum) of CONFIDENCE IN STATE with other variables at their minimum (maximum).  
As outlined above, the dependent variable in the respective models presented in tables 4 and 6 
is PREFERENCE FOR UN AUTHORITY counting the number of issue areas for which respondents 
                                                 
4 Since my dependent variable in the second stage is assumed to be ordinal, a standard Heckman model is presumably 
inconsistent and biased per se. I therefore recoded the variable PREFERENCES FOR UN AUTHORITY to a set of dummy vari-
ables (indicating a preference for UN authority in at least one, two, three, or four issue areas respectively) and employed 
a number of a modified Heckman selection models with a probit estimator in both stages. I could not find any evidence 
that the presented results are significantly biased. 
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chose the UN as the preferred locus of political decision making (as opposed to their national 
governments or regional institutions).  
Starting with estimates for the cognitive mobilization and public salience variables—
including POLITICAL INTEREST, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, and EDUCATION—the results are 
mixed (tables 4 and 5). As expected, EDUCATION is positively and significantly related to 
PREFERENCE FOR UN AUTHORITY (H1.3a) in all models, which suggests that education indeed 
increases the likelihood of citizens’ support for UN authority. However, estimates for the 
other two variables commonly held to measure aspects of cognitive mobilization are less ro-
bust. Coefficients for POLITICAL INTEREST switch signs and are not statistically significant in 
five of six models in table 4. Estimated coefficients for POLITICAL COMMUNICATION are con-
sistently positive but also vary substantially in size and significance across alternative specifi-
cations. Overall, the results for theoretically related variables on the public salience of the UN 
in the media (UN HEADLINES) and party manifestos (PARTY INTERNATIONALISM) are, again, 
in line with expectations (H1.3b).  
To further interpret the results I turn to simulated changes in the predicted probabilities, 
now of preferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas (table 5). According to 
the estimates in model 4.6, we see that the simulated probabilities increase substantially by 
about .17 over respondents who show extreme values both in POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
and EDUCATION (while keeping all other variables at their mean values). If we include the 
extreme values for the public discourse variables UN HEADLINES and PARTY 
INTERNATIONALISM in the calculations, then we find even more substantial change in the si-
mulated probability—about .31. That is, if we simulate the joint impact of cognitive mobiliza-
tion and political discourse variables the probability that respondents prefer UN authority (for 
more than two issue areas) more than doubles from .28 to .59. 
If public discourse makes such a significant imprint on individual attitudes, what kind of 
meaning is given to the UN to make the idea of global authority more or less appealing to 
citizens? We lack detailed information about UN related public discourse on a global scale, 
but WVS data provides us with information about individual attitudes that allows us to test 
alternative narratives found in the literature.  
Regarding cosmopolitanism, the results consistently suggest that cosmopolitan attitudes all 
play a significant and substantial role in explaining citizens’ preferences. Respondents support 
the idea of UN authority more strongly the more important they think global environmental 
problems are (table 4). Changes in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS alone causes a shift 
in expected probabilities (that respondents prefer UN authority for more than two issue areas) 
of about .12 (table 6). This is in line with my first “cosmopolitan” hypothesis, according to 
which citizens support the idea of UN authority the more global (i.e. driven by global functio-
nal interdependence) they perceive the salient political problems to be (H2.1). The relevance 
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Table 6: Multilevel Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Preferences for UN authority (2) 
Dependent Variable: N of issue areas for which respondents prefer UN authority (0-5) 
Model: 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 
Particularism      
UN FLOWS ($ PER 100 INH’S) -0.73***    1.70*** 
 (0.13)    (0.16) 
UN MISSION (SIZE AS %INH’S) -0.31***    -0.18*** 
 (0.04)    (0.05) 
UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS  0.01***   0.04*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00) 
UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER   -0.05  0.41*** 
   (0.03)  (0.09) 
UNSC MEMBER   0.14***  0.08# 
   (0.04)  (0.05) 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES ($, LOG)    0.03 0.10*** 
    (0.06) (0.01) 
DEVELOPMENT (GDP P.C.)    0.03 0.20*** 
    (0.09) (0.02) 
Controls      
POLITICAL INTEREST -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
COMMUNICATION 0.08* 0.07* 0.07* 0.08* 0.06# 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
POLITICAL EDUCATION 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
MALE 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
POSTMATERIALISM 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
UN CONFIDENCE  0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
STATE CONFIDENCE  -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.20*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GLOBAL ENVIRON’L PROBLEMS 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constants      
CUT1 -0.98*** -0.00 -0.68*** -0.28 4.65*** 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.09) (0.64) (0.30) 
CUT2 -0.04 0.93*** 0.26** 0.66 5.58*** 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.10) (0.65) (0.31) 
CUT3 1.02*** 1.99*** 1.31*** 1.72** 6.64*** 
 (0.14) (0.22) (0.11) (0.65) (0.34) 
CUT4 2.08*** 3.05*** 2.37*** 2.78*** 7.72*** 
 (0.15) (0.24) (0.13) (0.65) (0.37) 
CUT5 3.03*** 4.01*** 3.33*** 3.73*** 8.67*** 
 (0.19) (0.27) (0.16) (0.66) (0.40) 
      
S.D. OF RANDOM INTERCEPT  0.61 0.52 0.32 0.61 0.52 
INTRACLASS CORRELATION () 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.07 
BIC 167041.92 166634.34 176976.14 167041.55 160859.28 
AIC 166892.12 166493.38 176825.39 166891.75 160666.22 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -83429.06 -83230.69 -88395.69 -83428.87 -80311.11 
N Respondents 49607.00 49518.00 52439.00 49607.00 47818.00 
N Countries 43 44 46 43 42 
Note: Multilevel Ordered Logit (Random intercept proportional odds model). Robust standard errors clustered over countries 
are given in parenthesis. See appendix for countries included in the respective models. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
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of a cosmopolitan morality can be read from the estimates as well (H2.2). The more the re-
spondents adhere to a cosmopolitan ethic and want their political leaders to address global 
inequalities (MILLENNIUM GOALS) the more they want the UN to be in charge. The same 
holds for the estimated effects of preferred levels of foreign aid (MORE AID). The more that 
the respondents want the share of their respected national incomes that goes for foreign aid to 
be increased, the more we observe that they prefer UN authority. Comparing respondents with 
minimal and maximal values for one of these two variables, results in a change in the simulat-
ed probability of finding strong preference for UN authority of about .10 (table 6).  
Finally, a lack of confidence in national political institutions such as governments, parlia-
ments, and courts as measured by STATE CONFIDENCE significantly increases the likelihood 
that we will observe preference for UN authority. This matches the third cosmopolitan hy-
pothesis according to which citizens support the idea of global authority more, the less capa-
ble they perceive their own nation state to be in solving salient global political problems 
(H2.3). To evaluate the overall explanatory power of cosmopolitanism regarding the for-
mation of supportive attitudes towards UN authority, predicted probabilities show changes of 
.26, .35, and .40 for different combinations of extreme values in cosmopolitanism variables. 
This is strong support for my expectation that the cosmopolitan narrative is an important ideo-
logical context underlying public support for UN authority worldwide. 
These results are consistent but do not rule out the possibility that a substantial share (or 
lack) of public support for UN authority is due to particularism. To test for this, however, 
means that we have to fall back on contextual information because we lack individual level 
data on respective attitudes or perceptions. Moreover, important variables are strongly corre-
lated to each other (see table 8 in the appendix). While the full model presented in table 6 
(model 6.5) shows some signs of multicollinearity (variance inflation factor of 3.47), results 
of partial models (6.1-6.4) warn us that omitting some of these variables from the equation 
leads to strongly biased results. 
Given this significant handicap, there is nevertheless substantial empirical evidence that 
particularism might explain a great deal with respect to citizens’ support for UN authority. In 
line with expectations (H3.1), results for UN FLOWS suggest that financial aid administered by 
UN agencies significantly increases the mean level of support for UN authority in a given 
society, at least when controlling, for example, for DEVELOPMENT (“full” model 6.6). Esti-
mates for change in predicted probability is, again, substantial (+.24).  
Even if the financial benefits from UN membership seem to work in the expected direc-
tion, estimates also suggest a reversed—albeit moderate—effect for UN Peacekeeping (UN 
MISSION). The more UN peacekeepers per thousand inhabitants a country has had to host, the 
less one finds support for UN authority within its citizenry. The predicted probability of ha-
ving a preference for UN authority in more than two (of five) issue areas only moderately 
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increases by .07, if one compares the sample maximum case, Cyprus (1.59 peacekeeper per 
thousand inhabitants), with countries that hosted no UN mission over 10-year period prece-
ding the survey. What one may read from these estimates is presumably that UN peacekee-
ping is more often perceived as a cost than a benefit. This reflects an unexpected, but no less 
particularist, way of reasoning about UN authority. 
In the case of estimates for UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS, results match expectations accord-
ing to which citizens would tend to support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive 
that their own governments have successfully pushed for their positions in the UN General 
Assembly (H3.2). That is, the likelihood that we would find citizens more supportive of UN 
authority is significantly higher in states that have been less frequently outvoted than others in 
UN roll calls. The simulated effect of LIKE-MINDEDNESS is impressive, suggesting an increase 
in the probability of a strong preference for UN authority of about .44. 
The last set of particularism variables is designed to test whether power asymmetries in 
global politics can explain the variance in how citizens think about UN authority (H3.3). Re-
garding a seat on and veto power in the UN Security Council as measured by the dummy va-
riables UNSC MEMBER and UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER, estimates are not stable over diffe-
rent specifications of the models. However, if we assume the full model 6.5 to adequately 
control for important alternative factors (and model 6.3 to be severely biased because it omits 
them), we do find strong empirical support that institutional power asymmetries in the UN 
system itself motivate citizens to favor UN authority. 
Table 7: The impact of change from a particularist view, on the predicted probability of pre-
ferring UN authority for more then two (of five) issue areas 
 Predicted probabilities of preferring UN authority for more then two (of five) issue areas 
 
... at minimum ... at maximum 
Difference  
(min to max) 
… UN FLOWS .52 .76 +.24 
… UN MISSION .55 .49 -.07 
… LIKE-MINDEDNESS OF UNGA .21 .65 +.44 
    
… DEVELOPMENT (GDP p.c.) .40 .68 +.28 
… MILITARY EXPENDITURES (logged) .42 .67 +.26 
… UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER (0/1) .55 .64 +.09 
 
Joint impact of changes in “power” variables 
* 
   
DEVELOP’T & MIL’Y EXPENDIT’S & UNSC 
PERM’T MEMBER  .35 .83 +.49 
Note: Estimated initial differences in predicted probability assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other 
variables at their mean. Estimates are based on models presented in table 6.  
*Estimated for values in Burkina Faso and the US, the most extreme combination of values in the sample.  
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Similarly, the estimates for DEVELOPMENT and MILITARY EXPENDITURES suggest a much 
broader mechanism to be at work here that links citizens’ perceptions of whether they belong 
to the powerful or the weak in global politics to their attitudes for or against UN authority. 
The effects of both variables are estimated to be positive and statistically significant. That is, 
citizens seem to support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive power asymmetries 
in global politics to be in their country’s favor, be it in terms of belonging to the highly deve-
loped global North or being militarily strong (H3.3). The overall impact of the “power” vari-
ables is remarkable (table 7). Simulating the predicted probability for different combinations 
of extreme values in these variables suggests that the difference between citizens from most 
powerful and least powerful countries is about .49.  
In sum, for particularism, even if the analysis is based only on a contextual measurement, 
the estimates nevertheless suggest that the impact of non-cosmopolitan motives for (and 
against) UN authority is substantial and statistically significant. Expectations of direct costs 
(peacekeeping) and benefits (aid) seem to play a role, as do perceptions of a like-minded poli-
cy environment at the UN level and power asymmetries enhanced by UN authority to one’s 
advantage or disadvantage.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
According to the proposed two-step approach to public opinion formation on global authority, 
citizens first become cognitively mobilized to think about the UN as they increasingly deve-
lop an interest in political matters in general and as they are cued through education and by 
the media and political elites to believe in the political relevance of this institution. The analy-
sis of data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey provided strong evidence for the 
substantial role of cognitive mobilization and contextual cues for raising citizens’ awareness 
of UN authority. People form measurable attitudes about UN authority and these tend to be 
more positive the more educated they are, the more they share a broader interest in political 
matters and communication, and the more they are exposed to information in the media and 
election platforms that suggest the political relevance of the UN. A further factor influencing 
attitudes toward UN authority is whether people live in societies that receive UN aid or host 
UN missions. 
The analysis also offered important insights into what kind of reasons lead citizens to 
become favorable or unfavorable of UN authority in the second step. One way that citizens 
have been shown to “tick” is largely cosmopolitan in nature. Public support for UN authority 
is significantly linked to an individual’s having a cosmopolitan worldview according to which 
pressing political problems are of a global scope towing to functional interdependencies and 
universal normative obligations. The extent to which the citizens perceive themselves as ha-
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ving been left vulnerable by the nation state seems to play an important role as well. Thus, a 
cosmopolitan narrative of why global authority is desirable empirically matches why many 
citizens come to support UN authority.  
From a normative perspective the results have enormous implications. As stressed at the 
beginning of this article, the creation of political authority beyond the national level is already 
underway (Philpott, 1999; Cooper et al., 2008). In light of this trend, political cosmopolita-
nism argues that democratic procedures are needed in order to uphold normative aspirations 
such as autonomy, non-domination, or consent (Held, 1995; Archibugi, 2004). It is neverthel-
ess reasonable to suppose that democratic procedures alone cannot prevent the growth of an 
autocratic world order if a global citizenry is not present, who is willing and able to take char-
ge and hold empowered institutions accountable (Falk, 1995; Grant and Keohane, 2005). 
Thus the idea of democratizing global governance ultimately requires a significant level of 
global public awareness for global issues. It also needs public consensus on the basic rationale 
of a cosmopolitan order, including the idea that such salient global problems need authoritati-
ve global institutions to be properly addressed. The empirical results of this study call into 
question the stereotype of a seemingly elitist cosmopolitan project that lacks a real-world con-
stituency to make a cosmopolitan democracy legitimate at all (Calhoun, 1995). The results in 
fact provide some initial evidence that a cosmopolitanism order has already got a supportive 
constituency, as regards some of its basic underlying principles, and this is a compelling stan-
dard for calling a political order “socially legitimate” (Beetham, 1991). Assuming that the 
process of globalization and cognitive mobilization continues, the results suggest that increa-
sing awareness of global interdependencies may even lead to further growth among those 
societal groups that expect global authority to more effectively manage global problems, thus 
placing calls for a cosmopolitan democracy on sounder footing for the future. 
This study has also showed how particularism explains important parts of citizens’ attitu-
des towards UN authority. Particular interests have substantial explanatory power if we 
consider the direct benefits accruing or costs incurring from UN actions, or if take into ac-
count the degree to which the UN General Assembly constitutes a like-minded body in a 
shared policy environment. Beyond that, global power asymmetries are also consistently lin-
ked to citizens’ attitudes towards UN authority. Citizens of powerful nations—in terms of 
institutional privilege, economic development, and military might—view UN authority much 
more favorably than those of weaker countries. Thus there is ample evidence of a particularist 
logic behind at least some part of public support for and rejection of UN authority. This as-
pect must also be taken into account to guarantee a more balanced view of the social legi-
timacy of current global order.  
The results are normatively significant because they match a more critical perspective on 
power-based global governance. According to this view, the institutional design of global 
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governance more often than not reflects “the ability of great powers to establish international 
institutions and arrangements to further or preserve their interests and positions of advantage 
into the future, even as they do not directly or fully control those future arrangements” (Bar-
nett and Duvall, 2005: 58; Krasner, 1991). Following this line of reasoning, citizens are inde-
ed well advised to mistrust acts of delegation or pooling of authority on the international le-
vel—all the more so if they perceive themselves to be marginalized in current global politics. 
That people do indeed respond in this way should serve as a warning to current apologists of 
global order that social legitimacy is already in short supply. It should inform global gover-
nance architects that any attempt to simply “upload” authority to existing institutions is likely 
to lead to further politicization of global institutional arrangements, if matters of institutional 
inequality and skewed distribution of power are not convincingly addressed. After all, global 
institutions would soon become even more “dangerous places” (Moynihan, 1976) the more 
they begin to look like new centers of global authority. 
This said, the empirical findings are deficient in a number of ways and therefore point to 
some important directions for future research. Studies will have to clarify the extent to which 
elite cues work as a mechanism behind measured correlations between contextual factors as 
mentioned above. Future research should also focus on a more comprehensive set of instituti-
ons—preferably including a variety of local, national, and regional organizations—evaluated 
by citizens for their problem-solving capability and set in the context of citizens’ perceptions 
of currently pressing societal problems as well as their particular interests in policy outcomes.  
Finally, public preferences for or against global authority are presumably related to diffe-
rent legitimacy criteria and varying perceptions of the degree to which current global institu-
tions actually meet these criteria. Growing awareness of and expectations from global authori-
ty do not preclude existing institutions like the WTO, IMF, or UNHCR from becoming the 
objects of widespread criticism because of their lack of transparency, inclusiveness or accoun-
tability. On the contrary, growing beliefs in the effectiveness of internationalized governance 
will probably lead to a significant increase in citizens’ expectations of prudent policy on the 
output side as well as a democratic control on the input side (Scharpf, 1997; Machida, 2009; 
Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011; Zürn et al., 2012). In some cases it has already done so. Hence, 
future research should help us to understand the degree to which the emergence of new cen-
ters of political gravity on the global level spawns a desire for control by those affected, and 
sets the stage for a far more comprehensive theory of public legitimacy of global institutions. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 8: Bivariate Correlations between contextual variables (N=44, listwise deletion) 
 UN FLOWS UN MISSION UNGA LIKE-
MINDED’S  
UNSC PERM’T 
MEMB’R 
(VETO)
UNSC 
MEMBER 
DEVELOPMENT 
(GDP P.C.) 
UN MISSION 
 
.14   
UNGA LIKE-
MINDEDNESS 
.10 -.08  
UNSC PERMAN’T 
MEMBER (VETO) 
-.10 -.06 -.38*  
UNSC MEMBER 
 
-.24 -.24 -.25 .23  
DEVELOPMENT 
(GDP P.C.) 
-.63*** .003 -.53*** .10 .34* 
MILITARY 
EXPENDITURES 
-.63*** -.25 -.39** .43** .38* .55***
# p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 9: Countries included in the analysis 
 Table 4 (awareness models) Table 6 (preference models) 
 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 
Andorra X     X X X   X X     
Argentina X X   X     X X X X X 
Australia X   X X X X X X X X X 
Brazil X X   X   X X X X X X 
Bulgaria X X X X       X X     
Burkina Faso X     X   X X X X X X 
Canada X   X X X   X X X X X 
Chile X     X     X X X X X 
China X X   X     X X X X X 
Cyprus X     X     X X X X X 
Egypt X X   X     X X X X X 
Ethiopia X     X   X X X X X X 
Finland X   X X X X X X X X X 
Georgia X X X X     X X X X X 
Germany X X X X X X X   X X   
Ghana X X   X     X X X X X 
India X X   X     X X X X X 
Indonesia X X   X     X X X X X 
Iran X X   X     X X X X X 
Italy X   X X     X X X X X 
Japan X X X X X X X X X X X 
Jordan X X   X     X X X X X 
Mali X     X   X X X X X X 
Mexico X X X X     X X X X X 
Moldova X   X X     X X X X X 
Morocco X     X     X X X X X 
Norway X   X X X X X X X X X 
Poland X X X X     X X X X X 
Romania X X X X     X X X X X 
Rwanda X     X   X X X X X X 
Serbia X X   X     X X X X X 
Slovenia X X X X     X X X X X 
South Africa X     X   X X X X X X 
South Korea X X   X     X X X X X 
Spain X X X X X X X X X X X 
Sweden X   X X X X X X X X X 
Switzerland X   X X X X X X X X X 
Taiwan X X   X         X     
Thailand X X   X X X X X X X X 
Trinidad-Tobago X     X     X X X X X 
Turkey X X X X   X X X X X X 
Ukraine X X X X     X X X X X 
United States X   X X X X X X X X X 
Uruguay X     X     X X X X X 
Vietnam X     X     X X X X X 
Zambia X     X   X X X X X X 
N countries 46 24 20 46 12 19 43 44 46 43 42 
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